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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIE!'

erly assessable against him personally and certainly his personal representative could have been compelled to return for taxation items of income properly chargeable to the decedent prior to his death. He, however, kept his books on a cash basis and so no income tax was chargeable against him. But when the inheritance tax was figured this right
to receive income was quite properly, treated as an existing valuable
right of the estate, and taken into consideration in valuing it. This is
a shift to the accrual basis. Just as in income taxation on that basis, the
right to receive income in the future, is treated as the equivalent of
income already in hand, so here for inheritance tax purposes the right
to receive these sums is treated as if they were already received and
were a part of the estate. The subsequent actual receipt of the income
does not, therefore, enhance the estate, but this does not deprive the
receipt of the money of its intrinsic character of income. What the
decedent, whether by will or intestate law has done is to pass on to his
personal representative the right to receive income. That such right
should be burdened with the duty of paying the income tax due thereon seems indubitable. The laws of both the United States and Wisconsin provide that when a donee of property sells the same that the basis
on which the profit from the sale of such property shall be determined
shall be, not the value at the time he acquired it, but the cost of the
property to his donor. This apparent assessment to one person of a
profit which had accrued to another is justified on the theory that the
original owner of the property holds it "subject to the right of the
sovereign to take part of any increase in its value when separated
through sale or conversion and reduced to his possession, and that his
donee takes it subject to that burden." This line of reasoning is certainly doubly applicable to the personal representative of a decedent
who has acquired from the latter the right to collect items of income.
It is believed that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
Norris- and Smart cases deprives the state of income taxes to which
it is on every count justly entitled.
RAY A. BROWN*
CARRIERS-AGENCY-TORTS

vs. Railway Express Agency _.

OF AGENCY.

Wis

__.,

Ripon Knitting Works
240 N.W. 840. Here the

defendant common carrier delivered to and received from the plaintiff company considerable amounts of goods, some of the goods being
delivered C.O.D. For three years the driver for the defendant company delivered the goods to the plaintiff and collected the charges
U.S. 470, 49 Sup. Ct. 199 (1929).
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
9 Taft v. Bowers, 278

NOTES AND COMMENT

threon as was his duty to do. Without knowledge of either plaintiff
or defendant, the driver overcharged plaintiff, converting the excess
to his own use. Plaintiff seeks to recover the excess paid.
The Restatement of the Law of Agency lays down the following
propositions: "A principal who puts an agent in a position, while
apparently actingwithin his authority, to commit a fraud upon third
persons, is subject to liability to such third persons for such fraud,
and the liability is not removed by the fact that the agent was acting
entirely for his own purposes unless the other had notice of it."
With this general rule in mind let us take up the development of
the principle. One of the earliest cases, Friedlander vs. Texas and
Pac. R. Co. 130 U.S. 416, the agent of the railroadcompany in collusion with another person fraudulently issued a bill of lading to an
innocent holder for value. The goods were never delivered nor was
there any intention to deliver. The court held that the innocent holder
could not recover against the common carrier. This case was in part
overruled by Gleason vs. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. 278 U.S. 349,
the court holding that an exception, as in the Friedland case, exonerating the principal, where the agents acts with secret purpose to
benefit only himself and without knowledge or consent of the principal, is supported no more by reason than by authority. Much of
the force of the Friedland case has been removed by this ruling,
although we find numerous cases following the Friedland case, until
the Gleason case, which was decided in 1929. In Nat'l Park Bk. of
N. Y. vs. Louisville and N. R. Co. 199 Ala. 192, 74 So. 69, it was
held that the carrier was not liable for false bills of lading issued by
an agent who had only authority to supervise subordinates authorized
to issue bills of lading or by an unauthorized person acting under
such agent. While closely following the Friedland case there is a distinguishable feature between the two in that in the latter case there
was a seemingly lack of authority to issue such bills of lading. Berkovitz
vs. Morton-Gregon Co. 112 Neb. 154, 198 N.W. 868, is cited by the
Wisconsin court in forming their opinion. Here the agent fraudulently altered totals in the statements of accounts due, which he was
authorized to collect, so as to show larger amounts than were actually
due. He secured money upon these altered statements and converted
excess to his own use. The court held the principal liable.
From these cases, as the court points out, care must be exercised
to distinguish between authority to commit a fraudulent act, and authority to transact business in the course of which the fraudulent act
is committe.
The cases which hold that the principal is liable for the torts committed by his agent while transacting the principal's business, where

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEIV

the acts are not authorized, also hold the principal liable without fault
on his part for false representations, deceit and other wrongs of the
agent.
Here the driver had obtained the confidence of both plaintiff and
defendant, foi the driver had collected and turned over the proceeds
for three years without a dishonest act. The court held that the plaintiff was not negligent in relying on the accuracy of the driver's receipt,
and held the defendant express company liable for the agent's false
representations and overcharging.
LESTER WOGAH N

EQUITY-SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

The Tennessee

Power Company, defendant, petitioned White and Van Buren couninties, plaintiffs, for permission to raise its dam to a height of 75 feet
above the low water mark in Caney Fork river, the dividing line
between the two counties. It was apparent that the erection of a
larger dam would cause the waters in the river and tributaries to flood
certain bridges and fords which the counties maintained. As a condition to the granting of the permission sought, the company proposed
to raise the bridges and build others where the fords were destroyed,
without cost to the counties, agreeing to bear the "cost of continued
maintenance of said bridges." The bridges were raised or erected
and maintained until March, 1929, when an unprecedented flood damaged them in varying degrees. Upon the refusal of the power company
to repair them, suit was brought to compel performance of the contract. Specific performance was denied by the court, upon the following grounds: That proper performance would invoke an extensive
supervision of a series of acts, which a non-expert could not give, and
that there was a complete and adequate remedy at law, in a suit for
damages. Tennessee Electric Power Company vs. White County, 52
Federal 1065 (1931).
The general rule is that the courts will not decree specific performance of contracts for the erection of and repair of buildings,
the construction of works, and the conduct of operations requiring
special knowledge, skill or foresight. Pomeroy's Specific Performance
of Contracts (3rd Ed.) paragraph 23; Beck vs. Allison, 56 N.W. 366.
However, this supposed doctrine is burdened with many exceptions,
and its validity frequently denied. Jones vs. Parker, 163 Mass. 564.
Walsh, in his treatise on Equity, states "Where the remedy at law
is clearly inadequate, the bogy developed by the courts in the earlier
cases of the difficulty of necessary superintendence has been disregarded. The courts now realize that superintendence by the courts
or its representative is unnecessary, and that the court is called on

